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"Staggering Punitive Damages" Against
Labor Unions*
Thurlow Smoot**
T HE TWO U. S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS rendered in late
May, 1958, involving labor unions,1 have received wide-
spread publicity, have been the subject of much editorial and
other comment, and have caused considerable consternation
among labor unions and among some employers who see where
they may be involved. Now upon analysis, are the rulings of
great significance, worthy of the concern they have caused, por-
tending something new in labor relations? The probability is
that they are.
The Precise Holdings
What the cases actually hold can be stated briefly. In UAW
vs. Russell, Justice Burton, writing the majority opinion, stated
the sole issue to be "whether a state court . . . had jurisdiction
to entertain an action by an employee . . . against a union ...
for malicious interference with such employee's lawful occupa-
tion." And the Supreme Court's answer was that a state court
had such jurisdiction, thus affirming an Alabama Supreme Court
decision allowing one Paul Russell to recover $10,000 damages
from the UAW2 for preventing him from working during a strike.
Russell was an hourly employee and not eligible to representa-
tion by the union which had called the production employees out
on a legal strike. Russell was kept out of the plant, so the
Alabama jury had found, by illegal activities of the pickets; i.e.,
they physically stopped him from driving his car through the
picket line into the plant. In the companion case, JAM vs.
Gonzales, Justice Frankfurter, writing the majority decision,
* Warren, Chief Justice, in his dissent in UAW vs. Russell, 78 S. Ct. 932, at
p. 943, states "There is a very real prospect of staggering punitive damages
accumulating through successive actions by parties injured by members
who have succumbed to the emotion that frequently accompanies concerted
activities during labor unrest." (Emphasis added.)
** Member of the Cleveland, the Ohio and the American Bar Associations;
member of the firm Smoot and Riemer, Cleveland, Ohio; member of the
Council of Labor Relations Section of the American Bar Association; author
of legal articles.
1 UAW vs. Russell, 78 S. Ct. 932 (1958), and IAM vs. Gonzales, 78 S. Ct.
923 (1958).
2 International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Im-
plement Workers of America, UAW-CIO.
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posed the question to be whether a state court had jurisdiction
to award damages to Marcos Gonzales, who, after being illegally
expelled from the IAM,3 was denied work through the union
hiring hall. Again the Supreme Court upheld the state court's
jurisdiction.
In upholding the state court's jurisdiction in each of these
cases, the Supreme Court made two significant rulings: a) that
the doctrine of pre-emption was not applicable and therefore not
a defense to the unions here, and b) that punitive damages
could be awarded. Each ruling is important.
The Pre-emption Doctrine
The long-established doctrine of pre-emption is that action
by states cannot frustrate a federal act. It was first applied in
the labor relations field in 1952, in the Garner case. 4 The Su-
preme Court there held that the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, established the pattern of rights and remedies with
respect to certain conduct of unions and that state action there-
fore could not derogate, supplement or duplicate those rights.
The remedies consist of National Labor Relations Board cease-
and-desist orders which may include reinstatement of an em-
ployee to his job with back pay for time lost. Subsequent Su-
preme Court decisions have explained and expanded5 the doctrine
of pre-emption in the labor field. In Laburnum6 the Supreme
Court limited the doctrine by allowing state courts to award
damages to an employer whose plant had been closed down
through force and violence initiated by a union representing
none of his employees. The Court stated that it "sustained the
state judgment on the theory that there was no compensatory
relief [for the employer] under the federal act and no federal
administrative relief with which the state remedy conflicted." 7
3 International Association of Machinists.
4 Garner vs. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485.
5 Weber vs. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U. S. 468 (1955); Amalgamated Meat
Cutters and Butcher Workmen vs. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U. S. 20
(1957); Guss vs. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U. S. 1 (1957); United
Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America,
UAW-CIO vs. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board and Kohler Com-
pany, 351 U. S. 266 (1956); Youngdahl vs. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U. S. 131 (1957).
6 United Construction Workers vs. Laburnum Construction Company, 347
U. S. 656 (1954).
7 As digested by the Supreme Court itself in speaking of the Laburnum
case in Weber vs. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U. S. 468 (1955).
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Now the Supreme Court in the Russell case was considering
the question of tortious conduct by a union where the federal
act did protect the employee's right to work and did supply the
compensatory remedy of back pay for time lost. The court held
that although the federal board could award back pay, "Congress
did not establish a general scheme authorizing the Board to
award full compensatory damages for injuries caused by wrong-
ful conduct" and therefore the state court action was allowed.
And now in the Gonzales case, the Supreme Court was ruling
that the federal act did not pre-empt state court action because
the federal board could not order Gonzales reinstated in the
labor union from which he had been expelled and it was not
mandatory for the Board to order the union to pay him his back
pay, therefore the state court action was needed to "fill out" the
remedy by an award of damages.8
Chief Justice Warren wrote the dissenting opinions in each
case.9 In Russell, the Chief Justice said it was unnecessary to
decide whether the Board had duplicate remedial authority as:
This is a case in which the State is without power to
assess damages whether or not like relief is available under
the federal act. Even if we assume that the Board had no
authority to award respondent back pay in the circumstances
of this case, the existence of such a gap in the remedial
scheme of federal legislation is no license for the States to
fashion correctives.. .. The federal act represents an attempt
to balance the competing interests of employee, union and
management. By providing additional remedies, the States
may upset that balance as effectively as by frustrating or
duplicating existing ones.10
In Gonzales, the Chief Justice said the court and particularly
Justice Frankfurter were discarding the pre-emption doctrine:
In a pre-emption case decided upon what now seem to
be discarded principles, the author of today's majority opin-
s Heretofore state and federal courts, and the Supreme Court by denying
certiorari, had denied on the ground of pre-emption the recovery of dam-
ages by an employee from a union for interference with his employment
because of non-membership in the union. Borne vs. Laube, 213 F. 2d 407
(C. A. 9, 1954) (reh'ng. denied, 214 F. 2d 349, cert. den., 348 U. S. 855
(1954)); McNish vs. American Brass Co., 139 Conn. 44, 89 A. 2d 566 (1953)
(cert. den., 344 U. S. 913 (1953)); Mahoney vs. Sailors' Union of the Pacific,
45 W. 2d 453, 285 P. 2d 440 (1954); (cert. den., 349 U. S. 915 in 1955); and
Sterling vs. Local 438, Liberty Ass'n. of Steam and Power Pipefitters and
Helpers Ass'n., 207 Md. 132, 113 A. 2d 389 (1955) (cert. den., 350 U. S. 875
in 1955).
9 Justice Douglas was with the Chief Justice on the dissent and Justice
Black did not participate in the decisions.
10 78 S. Ct. 932, at p. 941.
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ion declared: 'Controlling and therefore superseding federal
power cannot be curtailed by the State even though the
ground of intervention be different than that on which fed-
eral supremacy has been exercised,' Weber vs. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc. I would adhere to the view of pre-emption ex-
pressed by that case and by Garner vs. Teamsters, C. & H.
Local Union, and reverse the judgment below."
But despite a division in the court on what it was doing
generally to the doctrine of pre-emption, specifically the court
ruled that doctrine to be no longer applicable in any tort or
breach of contract cases against unions.
The Law of Torts Applies
With the defense of pre-emption out, the general law of
torts is applicable and unions revert to being liable in an action
for torts committed by union agents. That the tort was com-
mitted on a legal picket line or in connection with a legitimate
labor dispute is immaterial. 1 2 So the Russell case, where the
tort was "wrongful interference with a lawful occupation" and
the Gonzales case where, although grounded on breach of con-
tract, the cause was among those cases holding that a wilful
breach of contract is a tort,13 the principle affirmed by the court
allowing damage suits against unions was not actually expanded
nor enlarged. 14 The new element, however, is that the torts here
involve only loss of wages without physical injury and union
leaders and attorneys always had presumed that labeling a loss
of work case a "tort" was merely semantics as all loss of work
cases were to be decided by the federal board and they had
thought that a cease-and-desist order and payment of back pay
11 78 S. Ct. 923, at pp. 931, 932.
12 "In considering the legality of the strike, picketing and the boycott, the
distinction should always be kept in mind between such forms of concerted
action, as such, and conduct which is tortious whether connected with the
labor dispute or not. Thus, trespass, assault and battery, and wilful de-
struction of property are wrongful and not less so because done in con-
nection with a strike or picket line." Harper and James, Law of Torts, p.
524 (1956).
13 Taylor vs. Atcheson, Topeka and S. F. Railway, 92 F. Supp. 968 (D. C.
Mo., 1950).
14 In the Russell case, the union conceded "the states' power to award
damages against . . . a union for physical injuries . . ." and in Gonzales,
the union did "not attack so much of the judgment [of the California court]
as ordered the [Gonzales] reinstatement," 78 S. Ct. 932, at p. 941 (Russell);
and 78 S. Ct. 923, at p. 924 (Gonzales). See also Hall vs. Walters, 226 S. C.
430, 85 S. E. 2d 729 (1955), cert..den., 349 U. S. 953 (1955); Real vs. Curran,
138 N. Y. S. 2d 809 (1955).
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was the heaviest penalty possible. Since even this penalty had
been originated only by the Taft-Hartley amendments in 1947,
unions considered this to be one of the odious portions of that
law. Only recently have they recognized the advantages of the
Taft-Hartley Act pre-empting the field from state courts and
this somewhat mollified them toward that portion of the federal
act. Now unions1 5 must face the fact that Taft-Hartley was much
the lesser ill. As their actions in loss-of-work cases are to be
scrutinized by juries aided by judges, 16 they find themselves in
agreement with the Chief Justice in decrying the weakening of
the federal act:
* ..Differing attitudes toward labor organizations will
inevitably be given expression in verdicts returned by jurors
in various localities. The provincialism this will engender
in labor regulation is in direct opposition to the care Con-
gress took in providing a single body of nationwide juris-
diction to administer its code of labor regulation.
17
Nevertheless, a weakened federal act or not, juries are going
to be scrutinizing union actions in loss-of-work cases and this is
not a minor problem. For instance, in the Russell case in the
state court, the union presented considerable evidence upon
which the jury could have found that the company involved in
the strike told its hourly and office employees not to attempt to
come to work. But the jury found the employees could have
worked had they been able to get through the picket line. Fur-
ther, there was evidence showing that Russell instigated the
15 And possibly employers also as Chief Justice Warren in his dissent in
the Russell case asks "Must we assume that the employer who resorts to a
lockout is also subject to a succession of punitive recoveries at the hands
of his employees?" Dissenting opinion, UAW vs. Russell, 78 S. Ct. 932, at
p. 943.
16 In the Russell case, the Trial Judge charged as follows:
"I charge you that unless you are reasonably satisfied from the evi-
dence in this case that the proximate cause of [Russell's] inability to
work at the Decatur Plant during the period from July 18, 1951 to
August 22, 1951, was that a picket line was conducted by the [union]
in a manner which by force and violence or threats of force and violence
prevented [Russell] from entering the plant, and unless you are reason-
ably satisfied from the evidence that work would have been available
to [Russell] in the plant during said period, except for the picketing
in such manner, you should not return a verdict for [Russell]."
"6. I charge you that unless you are reasonably satisfied from the
evidence that the acts complained of by [Russell] occurred, and that
[Russell] suffered a loss of wages as the natural and proximate result
of said acts, you should return your verdict for the [union]." (78 S. Ct.
932, at p. 935, footnote 3).
17 Dissenting opinion, UAW vs. Russell, 78 S. Ct. 923, at p. 942.
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trouble on the picket line; was organizer of a back-to-work
movement and initiated petitions headed "If the Company will
reopen the gates to the people, we will cross the picket line and
return to work"; obtained signatures to the petition; ran news-
paper advertisements; had opposed the organization of the union
and the calling of the strike and after the strike, organized a
club whose purpose was "carrying on the employer-employee
functions without the intervention of any union," and he initiated
a petition to decertify the union as bargaining representative for
the employees and initiated the idea of instituting damage suits
against the union and solicited others to file their damage suits.'
8
But this evidence of Russell's activities during the five-week
strike did not deter the jury from awarding him $500.00 for loss
of pay and $9,500 for the mental anguish he suffered through
the five-week loss of work.
In the Gonzales case, the lower court in California found
that there was sufficient evidence to support the IAM's determi-
nation that Gonzales was guilty of the offense with which he
was charged within the union-falsely accusing a union officer
of having assaulted him. It nevertheless found that the penalty
for the offense was not imposed in accordance with the internal
procedures prescribed by the union and its parent body, and for
that reason the union could not lawfully expel respondent from
membership for refusing to pay the fine assessed against him.19
Undisputed, however, is the fact that the union was wrong in
thereafter keeping Gonzales from working.
Thus, juries are to determine the merits of labor disputes
for which the expertness of the federal board heretofore was
considered necessary.20 And any loss of work caused by a labor
dispute, later found by a jury to have been wrongfully caused,
results in damages paid to those losing work even though they
are active participants on the other side of the dispute. While
unions are to be brought to severe account for their adherents'
stepping over the line, other active participants in the dispute,
if fighting the union, may receive monetary balm not only to
cover loss of wages incurred, but more in the form of punitive
damages; and the punitive damages is the vital aspect of the
Russell and Gonzales holdings.
18 Brief for petitioners, p. 10-14, UAW vs. Russell, 78 S. Ct. 932.
19 Brief for petitioners, p. 3, IAM vs. Gonzales, 78 S. Ct. 923.
20 NLRB vs. Coco-Cola Bottling Company, 350 U. S. 264; NLRB vs. United




Punitive damages are variously termed and described, but
are essentially extra damages granted because of the defendant's
use of malice, recklessness, wilfulness or ill will in committing
the acts alleged.2 1 There is no limit to the amount of damages
but the jury's good sense or the possibility of a trial judge or
appellate court upsetting an "excessive" verdict. Four states,
Louisiana, 22 Massachusetts, 23 Nebraska, 24 and Washington,25 (and
New Hampshire in some situations2 ") have by judicial decision
rejected the recovery of exemplary damages. In Connecticut,
such damages are limited to the amount of plaintiff's expenses
of litigation. 2 But in most other states, despite different defini-
tions in text books, articles, and cases, there is not much doubt
that exemplary or punitive damages, as in both the Russell and
Gonzales cases, are granted for mental anguish (Russell) and
mental suffering, humiliation and distress (Gonzales) ,27 even
where the judge charges, as he did in the Russell case, on the
penalty aspects alone.
28
21 "The terms 'exemplary,' 'punitive,' and 'vindictive' damages are used
interchangeably and such damages have also been designated as 'smart
money.' They go beyond the actual damages suffered in the case, and are
an exception to the general rule that in private actions, the injured party
is to be made whole, and that acts worthy of punishment are prosecuted
by the state." 16 0. Jur. 2d 141.
However, as an illustration of the confusion existing in defining "ex-
emplary" or "punitive" damages, the lower court in Gonzales, refused to
allow "exemplary" damages but allowed the jury to grant damages for
"mental suffering," humiliation and distress!
That the torts are not authorized by the union is of no value as a de-
fense as the rules of liability of a principal will apply. Those rules are that
exemplary damages may be assessed against a [Principal] for the wilful
and wanton acts of a subordinate employee if the officers or agents in
whom the management of its affairs is vested have participated in the
wrong: (a) by ordering the particular conduct of the agency or by issuing
general orders which would naturally produce such wrongdoing, or, (b)
by wanton carelessness, selecting or retaining (before the wrongdoing) an
unfit servant, or (c) by ratifying the wrongdoing of the agent by approving
the culpable conduct, declining to rectify it where it is possible to do so,
or keeping in the employ the guilty agent after knowledge of his wrong. See
McCormick, Damages § 80 (1935); and see, Oleck, Damages To Persons &
Property, §§ 271, 274 (1957 rev.).
22 Vincent vs. Morgan's etc., 140 La. 1027 (1917).
23 Burt vs. Advertiser Newspaper Company, 154 Mass. 238 (1891).
24 Boyer vs. Barr, 8 Neb. 68 (1878).
25 Spokane Truck and Dray Company vs. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45 (1891).
25a Burton v. Leavitt Stores Corp., 87 N. H. 304, 179 A. 185 (1935).
26 Dorozka vs. Lavine, 111 Conn. 575 (1930).
27 Some states by court decision unequivocably hold that exemplary dam-
ages are "to compensate plaintiff for wounded feelings, and injured dignity,"
(Continued on next page)
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Thus the most important effect of the Russell and Gonzales
cases, passed over lightly in the majority opinions but hammered
at by Chief Justice Warren in the dissenting opinions, is the fact
that exemplary damages for loss of work from tortious conduct,
instead of a restoration of the status quo, now will be the norm.
Employees obviously will prefer to recover large sums of money
as damages than just back pay and therefore will seek state
court instead of federal board action.
Damages for Mental Suffering
So, a totally new field comprising mental suffering arising
from illegal union action has arisen. Heretofore, if an employee
lost his job through union interference because of expulsion,
proper or improper, or because he was a non-member or was
wrongfully kept from work by a picket line, he could, through
federal action, be reinstated in his job and receive the amount
of back pay he lost. Thus, the restoration of the status quo could
always be achieved. But now, a vast new area of mental suffer-
ing through illegal action of a labor union has been made action-
able. Russell received $9,500.00 for his mental suffering; Gonzales
$2,500.00. Verdicts may become much higher. For instance, Rus-
sell requested $49,500.00 for his mental suffering. This new
theory can cause two effects: one, a union without tremendous
cash reserves may be deterred from legitimate union activities,
or two, a union engaged in a serious labor dispute can be
bankrupted.2 9 Discussing the first possible effect, Justice Warren
said:
The scant attention the majority pays to the large pro-
portion of punitive damages in plaintiff's judgment cannot
(Continued from preceding page)
Wise vs. Daniels, 221 Mich. 229 (1922); Kay vs. Parker, 53 N. H. 342 (1873).
28 In its charge to the jury, the trial court included the following statement:
"If, in this case, after considering all the evidence and under the
instructions I have given you, you are reasonably satisfied that at the
time complained of and in doing the acts charged the [union] . . .
actuated by malice and actuated by ill will, committed the unlawful
and wrongful acts alleged, you, in addition to the actual damages if
any, may give damages for the sake of example and by way of punish-
ing the [union] or for the purpose of making the [union] smart, not
exceeding in all the amount claimed in the complaint." (78 S. Ct. 932,
p. 935, footnote 3.) See the full list for all states in Oleck, supra, n. 21.
29 Because the picket line kept hourly-rated and office employees out of
the plant in the legitimate strike in the Russell case, suits have been filed
against the UAW by 89 persons requesting $1,500,000 in damages (listed in
78 S. Ct. 932, at p. 945, footnote 16), and in all of these cases the time lost
from work amounts to a negligible portion of the damages requested.
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disguise the serious problem posed by that recovery. The
element of deterrence inherent in the imposition or avail-
ability of punitive damages for conduct that is an unfair
labor practice ordinarily makes such a recovery repugnant
to the federal act. The prospect of such a liability on the
part of a union for the action of its members in the course
of concerted activities will inevitably influence the conduct
of labor disputes. There is a very real prospect of staggering
punitive damages accumulated through successive actions
by parties injured by members who have succumbed to the
emotion that frequently accompanies concerted activities
during labor unrest. This threat could render even those
activities protected by the federal act too risky to under-
take.30
Even a union with large cash reserves could be seriously hurt
financially. The strike resulting in the Russell case was com-
paratively small. If a union considered engaging in a strike
against a large corporation or entire industry, the possibility of
damage suits may well have a deterrent effect even to a large
and presumably wealthy union. Smaller unions could easily
have to face the issue of possible bankruptcy through any type
of concerted activity.
Conclusion
The two decisions are of great significance. Is there any
relief from the possibility of "staggering punitive damages"?
Some possible remedies come to mind: 1) a severe restriction
upon punitive damages in loss-of-work cases imposed by the
Supreme Court or by state courts in subsequent decisions; 2)
Congressional or state action banning exemplary damages as
they are now banned in five states; 3) Congressional action re-
turning exclusive jurisdiction to the federal board; and 4)
liability insurance for labor unions.
The first three suggested modes of relief are not likely to be
granted, although limits imposed by the Supreme Court itself
are not inconceivable. That leaves insurance as the only feasible
relief. However, two writers question whether liability insurance
covering exemplary damages may not be against public policy:
Insurance against exemplary damages frustrates their
purposes and should be considered contrary to public policy.
30 Dissenting opinion, UAW vs. Russell, 78 S. Ct. 932, at p. 942.
31 70 Harvard Law Review 517, at p. 526 (1957). See also 14 Mo. Law Re-
view 175 (1949).
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It is doubtful whether a reckless or malicious defendant will
be deterred if he knows that his liability insurer will pay
all damages levied against him. Furthermore, payment by
the insurance company, in effect, punishes the innocent
public which bears the cost through higher premiums.
31
But the one case specifically on this point carefully considered
the public policy argument and rejected it. 32
However, unless and until barred by law, insurance com-
panies undoubtedly will sell liability insurance to labor unions
although the premiums well may be astronomical. Insurance
seems to be the only answer at the present time, because lawyers
will be found to file the cases against unions whether, paraphras-
ing John Milton, "their purposes are on the prudent and heavenly
interpretation of justice and equity or on the promising and
pleasant thoughts of litigious terms, fat contentions and flowing
fees."
32 Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. vs. Welfare Finance Co., 75 F. 2d 58 (C. C.
A. 4, 1934), cert. den.. 295 U. S. 734 (1935).
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